Britain after the Afghan exit: The shifting threat of terrorism in Africa -By Darren Davids

The West’s neglect of Africa has allowed militant groups on the continent to emerge and flourish over the past two decades. Darren Davids writes that a reinvigorated post-Brexit UK has the opportunity to assert itself as a legitimate continental player through increased security and bilateral cooperation.

The new heart of Islamist jihadism

Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced in July 2021, that most troops from the United Kingdom (UK) have left Afghanistan. The announcement comes nearly two decades after the UK and other Western countries sent troops into Afghanistan to engage in what they described as the “war on terror”, following the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States. The stated purpose of the mission was to combat the growing Islamist jihadist threat in the heart of the Middle East – Afghanistan. Since 2012, though, the heart of the Islamist insurgency has seemingly shifted to the African continent.

The West’s strong focus on the Middle East over the last two decades has allowed groups to emerge and grow in Africa, largely undeterred, with African governments seemingly unable to stop them. The emergence and spread of local and transnational extremist organisations have become the primary contributor to insecurity in Africa. Groups operating on the continent include al-Shabaab in Somalia and other parts of East Africa; Boko Haram, and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) in Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin; the Islamic State affiliated Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali and parts of the West Africa region, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that has spread from Algeria to the wider Sahel region.

So far, the UK and the rest of Europe have largely let France lead the way in addressing worsening insecurity across the Sahel – incidentally many of which are former French colonies. Paris has deployed its largest recorded overseas military force in former colonies of Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In January 2013, the Malian government requested military aid from France through the United Nations Security Council, after Islamist militants captured dozens of northern cities, including Konna, a locality approximately 600 km northeast of the nation’s capital, Bamako. The fall of Konna underscored the need for urgent foreign intervention. However, the ongoing financial and political burden has recently proved costly for France, leading to a decision to gradually reduce its number of forces in the region from 5,000 to between 2,500 and 3,000. This withdrawal of troops could potentially lead to a security vacuum in the region if the European Union (EU) Takuba Task Force, the joint task force set to replace France, does not have sufficient buy-in from signatory states. This could prove dangerous for the stability of the region, which in turn would affect trade, development and bilateral relations between the states of the Sahel and the West.

Will the UK now shift its focus to Africa?

The UK’s role in Africa’s security environment is currently limited to the supply of military equipment, small contingents of armed forces (often in a non-combative role), training, and humanitarian assistance. Its largest contingent is deployed as part of a peacekeeping mission in Mali, comprising of 18,000 peacekeepers that form part of the 56-nation Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It also conducts an ongoing mission in Somalia, which is intended to secure the seaways from Europe to Asia. Additionally, the UK also supports the Nigerian military through equipment and training to combat terrorists in the northern region of the country and assists authorities with the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

In December 2020, 250-300 additional personnel, mostly from the Light Dragoons and 2^nd Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment were deployed to Mali as part of the UK’s contribution to MINUSMA. Mali is currently struggling to contain the growing Islamist insurgency, which has killed more than 400 people in 2020 alone. The Malian government has struggled to contain the outbreak of violence following its first coup in 2012, then its second coup in August 2020, followed by its latest coup in May 2021.

Despite the much trumped, “Pivot to The Sahel” under then Prime Minister Theresa May, Britain’s latest deployment of armed forces to Mali does not signal any strategic shift of UK’s foreign policy goals in Africa. Apart from these missions, there seems to be little appetite from the UK to play a significant military role in other African conflicts. This is aptly reflected in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy document, which outlines the UK’s foreign policy and strategic goals until 2030. The document fails to sufficiently address the UK’s role in Africa and has led to cuts in aid spending from 0.7 percent of GDP to 0.5 percent, which coupled with the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, will have major negative consequences for the international development and security landscape of the African continent.

The UK’s involvement in Afghanistan with its initial deployment in 2001, was a strong show of support to its main ally, the US and directly affected its national security and interests. Despite the justifications for the Afghani War, it was deeply unpopular back home. Given that it has only just withdrawn its troops from its longest-running and costliest war, the UK will not immediately be willing to financially, militarily or politically invest in African conflicts or the rising extremist threat, despite its apparent negative long-term consequences for the West. Instead, the UK government seems content to play a supporting role to the UN, US and French missions on the continent.

An opportunity awaits

With the French set to reduce their footprint in the region, there is a new opportunity for the UK to play a significant role in the Sahel and across the continent. With its new, independent post-Brexit credentials as a “Force for Good”, and with Africa currently accounting for only 2.5 percent of the UK’s trade, opportunities are aplenty for an integrated approach to exponential trade, development, and security cooperation. Recently, the UK has been on a much publicised and highly successful bilateral engagement of the continent, with trade deals inked with Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Kenya, among other states. This could be further complimented with military assistance and a gradual, tiered deployment of troops to insecure regions on the continent, such as the Sahel and the West Africa region. Not only does this approach potentially fill in the security vacuum that will soon be left by the French, but also helps create stable conditions for the newly inked bilateral trade and international development deals to flourish for a post-Brexit UK.

Additionally, much like the war on terror in Afghanistan was perceived to be a global responsibility, the war on terror in Africa also requires the collective responsibility of the global community, including the West. While many African states and leaders continue to espouse the catchall phrase “African solutions to African problems”, the UK should now assert itself as a legitimate continental partner as both history and recent events show that we are all related in this global village and the activities and atrocities in one part of the village will eventually affect other parts. The opportunity exists. The question is; will the UK seize it?