On the Relocation of the Nigerian Military Command Structure -By Olalekan Waheed Adigun

Olalekan Waheed Adigun

Moving the higher echelons of the military to troubled spots will make them have quality briefs, reports and field orientations, which is about all that is needed in the fight against terrorism.

In his inaugural address to the nation, Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari gave a strange order for the Military Command Centre or the Headquarters to immediately relocate to Maiduguri till terrorism is defeated. Since he made this speech, many so-called military “experts” or analysts have suddenly sprung up to voice their opinions on the matter which has the capacity, or otherwise, to solve or deter our efforts at fighting terrorism.

Of all the opinions I have read or heard, either for or against this, I must confess I saw little or no logic in most of them other than ethno-political sentiments. I soon saw how quickly ignorance spreads.

Napoleon Bonaparte is considered one of the greatest generals in history. He achieved this feet, not by siting in the comfort of his Command or Headquarters in Paris, he always led the battle himself. His entire military campaigns were directed by a single commanding mind. He received quality field reports, intelligence and battle briefs due to his presence in the battle field.

Before we go further, let me make some clarifications. I am not a military expert. I have no military experience or training, save for the three weeks camping for the Nigerian Army Short Service Combatant (SSC) Commission for which I couldn’t make the final list in 2014. If there is anything I know about the military, it is purely from my interactions with soldier friends when I went for the National Youth Service, when I stayed briefly in a military barracks in Adamawa State in 2013.

In my opinion, most of us, or perhaps our military “experts” are missing out on some basic points which are crucial in our understanding of the fight against terrorism. The issues are not made easier when we continue to look at them from purely ethno-emotional lenses.

We are not used to these kinds of radical decisions made by a true commander-in-chief, perhaps this is why we are used to pot-bellied generals, commanders and lazy soldiers, as products of a below-efficient military brass.

First, we need not be reminded that Muhammadu Buhari is the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces by virtue of his position as President of the Federal Republic. The 1999 Constitution under which he took his oath of office, confers upon him certain powers under section 218(1) to “determine the operational use of the armed forces of the federation.” My simple, layman understanding of the term “operational use” includes but is not limited to the establishment of bases, formations, command, divisions and subdivisions in any component of the armed forces in any part of the federation. If the Commander-in-Chief then, in his wisdom, chooses to relocate the command centre to any part of the federation for operational efficacy, then I see nothing wrong in that.

Perhaps, some fears are due to geographical factors. One of the arguments is that moving the military headquarters out of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) will not prove effective. This argument is supported with the fact that the command centre is not the infantry, hence it is a waste of time to relocate it. I immediately reached for my copy of the 1999 Constitution again, and there was no clause in the entire document that made the President’s action in this matter illegal.

If we looked carefully, we would have found out that the group is not as strong as its has been made to look like; but for the reckless (in)decisions of the politico-military establishment, the group would already be in a footnote of history.

A prominent military analyst has defined a commander-in-chief as someone who keeps himself abreast of a situation, makes expedient decisions for an operation or battle, assigns combat missions opportunely and completely, disseminates the decision to units and sub-units, organises interactions, renders total support to troop operations and puts decisions into effect firmly and resolutely. We are not used to these kinds of radical decisions made by a true commander-in-chief, perhaps this is why we are used to pot-bellied generals, commanders and lazy soldiers, as products of a below-efficient military brass.

Moving the higher echelons of the military to troubled spots will make them have quality briefs, reports and field orientations, which is about all that is needed in the fight against terrorism.

We must be quick to admit that there are no hard and fast rules to fighting groups like the Boko Haram. This is where we must quote the great Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic, On War, where he writes, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” On the surface, fighting Boko Haram and defeating terrorists looks easy, but fully conquering them involves lot of complexities which are too detailed for a single article. If we looked carefully, we would have found out that the group is not as strong as its has been made to look like; but for the reckless (in)decisions of the politico-military establishment, the group would already be in a footnote of history. If Boko Haram militants can flee at the advancement of the Chadian and the Cameroonian Armies, finding comfort on Nigerian soil under the full glare of the “almighty” Nigerian army reveals how we are not just doing things right!

Adolf Hitler missed out on Napoleon’s great strength by relying too much on information from his high command in Munich during the World War II. He and his generals were almost never on the battle field. They sat comfortably at the headquarters analysing contradicting field reports.

It is at this point that the risky decision to relocate the full presence of the Nigerian army to the troubled areas makes some sense. If after this Boko Haram proves stronger than the entire army, then the time has come to take a long, hard look at the Nigerian army itself!

Napoleon Bonaparte is considered one of the greatest generals in history. He achieved this feet, not by siting in the comfort of his Command or Headquarters in Paris, he always led the battle himself. His entire military campaigns were directed by a single commanding mind. He received quality field reports, intelligence and battle briefs due to his presence in the battle field. We might not remember him today had he just sat in his high command barking out orders like we have today in the Nigerian military.

Adolf Hitler missed out on Napoleon’s great strength by relying too much on information from his high command in Munich during the World War II. He and his generals were almost never on the battle field. They sat comfortably at the headquarters analysing contradicting field reports. Little wonder the well-equipped German army fell like a pack of cards. The rest is history. I cite these two examples just to show how long our generals have been sleeping. Like I wrote in an earlier article, “How to Fight Terrorism”, there are no conventional rules when it comes to fighting this monster. Several minute details often prove critical or decisive, which is part of the complications Clausewitz wrote about. Roads get clogged, troops refuse to report to their assigned stations for mobilisation (or leave and return home after they have reported), equipment are inadequate or out of date, troops are not trained in the use of equipment that might be up to date, and so on. All these notwithstanding, we are aware that relocating the military command to Maiduguri might not end the menace of Boko Haram overnight, but it can be part of the solution. This is my humble opinion on the matter!

Olalekan Waheed Adigun is an academic, political risk analyst, psephologist, and researcher who writes from Lagos. He can be reached on http://olalekanadigun.com/, olalekan@olalekanadigun.com, and Twitter: @adgorwell.