Policing Beyond Politics: An Assessment of the Implications of the Presidential Push for State Police -By DSP Adamu M. Muhammad (Rtd)

1.0 Preamble:

The debate over whether Nigeria should establish state police has resurfaced with considerable intensity. While the idea may appear attractive and politicallyconvenient, especially amid rising insecurity, a deeper examination of Nigeria’s historical experience, institutional decay and political realities shows that creating state police at this moment poses grave dangers to national stability, internal security and the safety of law‑abiding citizens. This position is informed by decades of policing experience, eyewitness knowledge of institutional decline and an understanding of how successive governments have systematically weakened the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and diverted its core mandates to newly created agencies.

2.0 Historical Neglect of Statutory Responsibility: From the era of military dictatorship to the current civilian administration, the police have been the most neglected national institution in Nigeria. Successive governments have damaged the structure of policing and crime prevention by:

i. Underfunding the NPF for decades despite increasing security challenges.
ii. Carving out critical police units and converting them into new agencies, thereby diluting operational capacity.
iii. Stripping the police of vital responsibilities originally within its statutory mandate.

2.1 Historical Record: The Nigerian Army, Nigerian Correctional Service, Fire Service and early traffic enforcement agencies such as the Vehicle Inspection Officers (VIO) evolved from policing structures. More recently, the DSS, FRSC and EFCC were established to take over roles once handled by police departments, such as the Special Branch, Federal Highway and Traffic Divisions and Anti‑Fraud Investigation units. This progressively weakened the police while empowering other agencies, yet the same governments that systematically crippled the NPF now claim that state police is a miraculous solution to Nigeria’s insecurity.

3.0 Systematic Looting and Asset Stripping of the Police: One of the most destructive developments is the silent liquidation of police assets across the country:

i. Barracks lands sold to private developers in collaboration with senior officers.
ii. Divisional and Area Command lands converted to commercial estates, with only a few blocks of buildings given in exchange.
iii. Proceeds of these transactions never accounted for nor reinvested in the Force.
iv. Police equipment, including operational vehicles, is being auctioned as scrap, often without replacement, leaving commands without functional patrol vans.

4.0 The Office of the Inspector‑General of Police: The Nigerian Police Force has been bled dry from the inside, yet instead of reforming and rebuilding the institution, political elites now propose state police, a concept that would multiply the same corruption and mismanagement at thirty‑seven (37) state command levels. Constitutionally, the Inspector‑General of Police must be appointed from among serving members of the Force not below the rank of Assistant Inspector‑General of Police, by presidential prerogative after consultation with the Police Council, which the 36 state governors are members.

The Police Establishment Act 2020 stipulates retirement after 35 years of service or at age 60, whichever comes first. Section 7(6) of the same Act provides a four‑year tenure for the Inspector‑General, creating controversy over whether reaching the retirement age of 60 automatically terminates the IGP’s tenure or whether the fixed term overrides standard retirement rules, may be a debate for another time.

5.0 Collapse of Welfare and Operational Conditions: The welfare of police personnel in Nigeria is among the worst in the public service:

i. Officers purchase their own uniforms, boots and equipment.
ii. Merit is no longer a criterion for promotion; officers attached to politicians receive promotions ahead of superiors, eroding morale.
iii. Lower commands receive virtually no overhead, forcing Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) to fund station operations through unofficial means.
iv. There has been no federal investment in building police stations, offices or barracks in recent years.
v. Patrol vehicles donated by states, LGAs and philanthropists remain the only reason many divisions can function.

5.1 Broken Training Culture: A critical but often overlooked challenge is the long‑standing decay of the training culture within the NPF. In today’s Nigeria, nomination for a training course is often perceived as punishment or marginalisation, especially for officers on lucrative postings. Posting as instructors is widely seen as exile for officers who have fallen out of favour, rather than as an opportunity to shape future policing. This mindset has produced a force where thousands of officers spend ten, twenty, or even thirty years in uniform without attending a single seminar, refresher course, or professional development programme. The consequences include outdated policing methods, poor investigative standards, low morale and a widening capacity gap. Modern police organisations worldwide are training‑driven; continuous learning must be a mandatory requirement for career progression.

5.2 Retirement Conditions: Post‑service life for Nigerian police officers is equally deplorable:

i. Many retired officers receive ridiculously small gratuities.
ii. Police pensions sometimes amount to less than 25 % of the final monthly salary.
iii. Only a few officers fortunate enough to serve with political power benefit from the National Housing Scheme; the majority retire with no shelter and must move from barracks to rented accommodation.
iv. Retirees often struggle to survive, a humiliation for those who dedicated their lives to national security.

6.0 Dangers of State Police within Nigeria’s Political Realities: The chronic neglect described above exposes the hypocrisy behind calls for state police. If the federal government has abandoned its constitutional police responsibilities, why should anyone believe the states will do better? Rather than complementing security, state police may worsen it, considering:

6.1 Political Culture and Abuse: The Nigeria’s political culture is heavily influenced by godfatherism, thuggery and patronage networks. Evidence already exists:

i. Many states recruit political thugs, drug addicts and ex‑convicts into state traffic agencies and neighbourhood watch groups.
ii. Such individuals are armed with uniforms and authority, deployed not only to maintain law and order but also to settle political scores.
iii. These actors would become state police officers answerable solely to governors seeking to consolidate power.
iv. Appointment of state police chiefs would likely mirror the current unmerited and controversial appointments seen for the Inspector‑General of Police.

6.2 Historical Precedent: Pre‑independence and post‑independence Nigeria have witnessed similar arrangements. During the First Republic, Native Authority Police and Local Government Police were used to intimidate opponents, manipulate elections and suppress demonstrations, especially in the northern region where Emirs and chiefs held sway. This contributed to political instability that culminated in the 1966 military coups. Reintroducing state police risks reviving the same dangerous pattern.

6.3 Threat to National Unity and Inter‑State Relations: Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) states that there shall be a police force for Nigeria and that no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof. The recent presidential directive to the National Assembly to amend the Constitution to accommodate state police reflects a failure and ineptness on the part of the President to discharge constitutional responsibilities, reinforcing suspicions of elite complicity in the current security crisis. Multiple police services amid deep ethnic, religious and political divisions could:

i. Create 37 rival armed forces with inconsistent training, standards and loyalties.
ii. Encourage state governors to pursue parochial agendas.
iii. Result in inter‑state clashes, profiling, and jurisdictional conflicts.
iv. Endanger non‑indigenes living outside their home states.

7.0 What Nigerians Actually Require: A viable security solution does not require dismantling the national police. Nigeria needs a stronger, efficient, and effective federal police service, not state‑run forces. Urgent reforms are needed to reposition the police as a modern, knowledge‑based law‑enforcement agency aligned with global best practices, where training is a right, not a punishment.

7.1 Genuine Police Reform:
i. Proper funding, training, equipment and welfare.
ii. Professionalisation free from political manipulation.
iii. Restoration of stolen lands, barracks and assets.
iv. Independent oversight structures to prevent abuse.

7.2 Decentralisation within the Force: Instead of creating state police forces, the following could be implemented:

i. Establish state command autonomy with legally guaranteed financial allocations.
ii. Allow states to support but not control operational decisions.
iii. Improve community‑policing structures under a unified national doctrine.

7.3 Strengthen Internal Security Agencies: Rather than multiplying police forces, Nigeria should:

i. Rebuild the NPF’s investigative capacity.
ii. Reinforce intelligence‑led policing.
iii. Merge overlapping agencies performing police functions.

8.0 Conclusion: The call for state police is a politically convenient but dangerous proposal that ignores Nigeria’s historical experiences, institutional failures and political realities. Any meaningful security solution must begin with rebuilding, not replacing, the Nigeria Police Force. Before decentralising policing, Nigeria must first repair the national police system it has spent decades destroying. Without fundamental reforms, state police will only:

i. Strengthen political thuggery.
ii. Endanger civil liberties.
iii. Escalate insecurity.
iv. Threaten the unity and stability of the Nigerian state.

DSP Adamu M. Muhammad (Rtd) CSS, Mniss, Miips, CCSO – Retired Police Officer, Protective Security & Safety Consultant
admamur@yahoo.com
a.m.muhammad1211@gmail.com
+234 803 234 9920
+234 916 422 2246