U.S. Airstrikes: Why Not in Borno, Zamfara, or Benue State? –By Matthew Ma

On December 25, while many were celebrating Christmas, U.S. military forces conducted an operation against ISIS-linked militants in Sokoto State, Nigeria. This news took several Nigerians by surprise, as Sokoto, located in northwestern Nigeria, has historically not been regarded as a stronghold for ISIS. The State has enjoyed relative peace, leading many to believe an attack there is unlikely. In contrast, States such as Borno, Zamfara, Yobe, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kwara, and Kogi are more frequently associated with terrorist activities due to their well-documented histories of violence and insurgency linked to extremist groups. Therefore, one might have expected such an operation to target these States first, rather than Sokoto, yet the outcome was indeed different. The airstrike in Sokoto raises several critical questions about the motivations and intelligence that guided this operation. Why would Washington choose to target ISIS in a region that has not previously been associated with an active ISIS presence? Was there new intelligence suggesting a shift in the operational strategies of these ISIS groups, or was this strike the result of propaganda or merely social media speculation? Was the U.S. action part of a broader strategy aimed at disrupting emerging threats before they can establish a foothold?

For many years, political leaders in Nigeria have persistently rejected claims that violent acts committed within the country are driven by jihadist ideology. They assert that the fundamental reasons behind the violence are rooted in fierce competition over land and resources, which are often exacerbated by socioeconomic factors. These officials maintain that violence is occurring as a result of local grievances and conflicts rather than being associated with religious extremism or organized criminal activity. However, the U.S. airstrike indicates a shift in the narrative of these violent outbreaks. It reveals that the Nigerian government’s focus on resource competition overlooks the significant ideological factors that are orchestrating the violence. The U.S. airstrike illustrates that these attacks are not only local disputes over territory but are also deeply rooted in broader jihadist sentiments aiming to impose an ideological framework within the region. This contrast in perspectives underscores the complexities of the violence: Nigeria publicly denies the jihadist threat while discreetly permitting foreign airstrikes against ISIS on its territory.

The airstrike in Sokoto should prompt Nigerians to ask uncomfortable questions, rather than settle for convenient explanations. The critical question should be: what does this situation reveal about the State’s control over its territory? If a foreign power can successfully identify, track, and strike targets in Sokoto rather than the familiar places, why has the Nigerian State been unable to demonstrate the same level of decisiveness? Are there regions in the country where the State’s authority has diminished, creating security vacuums that external actors are now exploiting? Let me first, clarify that modern counterterrorism operations are driven by intelligence rather than sentiment. The United States does not deploy its air power in areas based on propaganda or social media gossip, but rather where internationally designated terrorist groups have been identified, located, and confirmed through actionable intelligence. The strike in Sokoto was reportedly aimed at specific ISIS-linked cells whose activities align with the global counter-ISIS framework under which the United States operates. This distinction sets Sokoto apart from many other regions in Nigeria experiencing violence.

Second, the airstrike targeting ISIS-linked militants, offers significant insights into American intelligence capabilities and the methodologies employed in intelligence gathering. Reports have suggested that these extremist factions, notably those affiliated with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) as well as groups like Lakurawa, have established fortified camps within Sokoto and its neighboring regions. The strategic significance of Sokoto is heightened by its proximity to the Sahel region, which has emerged as a notorious corridor for jihadist activities. As a result, the area has witnessed a disturbing increase in insurgent operations, prompting both U.S. intelligence agencies and Nigerian authorities to categorize these entities as actionable targets for military intervention.

Third, the airstrike illustrates that American intelligence is not only aware of the locations of these extremist groups but is meticulously tracking their movements and activities. It means American intelligence is acutely aware of the problem’s location. Effective military strategies go beyond engaging in confrontations where gunfire is most audible; they focus on dismantling the intricate networks that enable these groups to operate. This includes disrupting their lines of communication, funding streams, and command structures that support their insurgent campaigns. True victories in modern warfare are achieved not just through brute force but by dismantling the fundamental organization behind the violence, targeting the pivotal individuals involved, and eroding the support systems that empower them. Sokoto State has the necessary structure, coordination, planners, and enablers, which is why the U.S. struck on its soil.

On the other hand, Borno State stands as the epicenter of Boko Haram and ISWAP atrocities. However, it is also the focal point of extensive military operations led by Nigeria, supported by regional forces and international partners through training, coordination, and intelligence. The absence of U.S. airstrikes in Borno does not indicate the lack of ISIS-linked threats; instead, it underscores a policy decision to entrust kinetic operations to Nigerian forces, who are already deeply embedded in that region. Similarly, the situations in Plateau, Benue, and Kogi illustrate an even more intricate landscape. While the violence in these regions—though brutal and unacceptable lacks the defined structure of a globally recognized terrorist organization with precise command-and-control mechanisms. Addressing these conflicts necessitates political solutions, policing reforms, and the pursuit of justice—not foreign military intervention. An American airstrike in such contexts would raise significant legal, ethical, and sovereignty issues.

That being said, the Sokoto strike reveals a discomforting reality: Within Nigeria, the atmosphere seems normal, with people celebrating, sharing photos, and expressing gratitude towards America. However, the international community’s perspective tells a different story. Nigeria is now being associated with terrorism—an association that has been overlooked for too long since the tenure of President Goodluck Jonathan. The first indication of trouble is the imposition of travel restrictions, affecting both domestic mobility and arrivals from abroad. This is followed by negative portrayals in diplomatic, military, political, and media circles. Consequently, Nigeria now faces the urgent task of proving its safety for travel within its borders. Given that Nigerian leaders have ignored warning signs and the situation has escalated beyond manageable control, the process for redemption will neither be swift nor straightforward.

I have emphasized this in my previous articles. Addressing terrorism necessitates decisive action rather than mere media spectacle. It is counterproductive to squander resources on debates over terminology or on theoretical discussions of the labels applied to these individuals: “They are bandits, not terrorists; local criminals, not ISIS.” This perspective is not born from ignorance but is intentionally aimed at distracting us from the issue. What we are currently witnessing should signal the beginning of an extensive and intensified effort against terrorism. The fight against these threats must be direct and resolute. Who has created the vacuum that has allowed terrorists to commit atrocities for over 16 years? Who engages in negotiations with them, who pays ransoms, and who appeases their actions?

For those of us who have long advocated for American intervention in international conflicts, the current reality of a U.S. military presence in Nigeria is finally taking shape. However, I have concerns regarding the U.S. airstrikes on Nigerian soil—not because we should tolerate terrorism or because ISIS-linked groups deserve sympathy, but because an airstrike alone is insufficient. If the U.S. government is genuinely committed to this effort, it must go beyond mere military action. Sponsors of terrorism need to be identified, negotiators must be interrogated, spokespersons held accountable, and political protectors stripped of their influence. One cannot simply bomb terror camps while allowing their financiers to live comfortably in Agbadas and air-conditioned homes.

So far, there is currently a lack of independently verified casualty figures following the airstrike targeting ISIS-linked positions in Sokoto State, Nigeria. This situation is marked by significant ambiguity, as no credible sources have confirmed the extent of the damage or the number of deaths resulting from the operation. Moreover, ISIS has not released any information regarding their own losses as a consequence of the airstrike. Typically, in the aftermath of such incidents, the group would quickly issue statements outlining its retaliatory plans or refuting claims about its casualties. However, the absence of any communication from ISIS at this point is rather unusual and raises questions about the impact of the attack on their operations. The lack of information from both the American and Nigerian governments further compound the silence surrounding this situation. Their failure to address the public adds to concerns about transparency in the conflict and the potential ramifications for regional stability. The uncertainty surrounding the effects of the airstrike continues to generate apprehension among analysts and observers.

There is a pressing need for accountability and transparency. Nigerians deserve clear answers regarding who authorized the strike, under what legal framework it was conducted, and what safeguards were in place to prevent civilian casualties. Silence or vague assurances only serve to erode public trust. In a democracy, security cooperation cannot remain a clandestine affair managed by a select few officials. Most critically, I am concerned that foreign airstrikes may divert attention from the fundamental governance failures that fuel insecurity, such as weak policing, inadequate intelligence coordination, porous borders, unresolved grievances, and economic desperation. No foreign military can replace a state that consistently protects lives and administers justice fairly. While external strikes may eliminate militants, they do not rebuild the institutions essential to long-term stability. This concern is neither anti-American nor supportive of terrorism; it is fundamentally pro-Nigeria. A nation with over 220 million citizens should not find itself moving toward a future where decisive force against threats on its territory relies on external actors. While security cooperation is legitimate, security outsourcing is not. If Nigeria does not urgently enhance its own capacity to secure all regions equitably—without waiting for international endorsements or foreign interventions—then today’s airstrike may set a troubling precedent. Once established, such precedents are often difficult to reverse.

Therefore, I call on the federal government to seize control of both the narrative and the strategy surrounding national security. If foreign assistance is sought, it should be conducted with transparency, national-level coherence, and adherence to Nigeria’s sovereign priorities, rather than being driven solely by external threat classifications. Simultaneously, the government must resist the urge to outsource the legitimacy of security to foreign powers while domestic communities continue to remain unprotected. The American strike in Sokoto should not be viewed merely as a military incident; rather, it should be seen as a reflection of Nigeria’s intelligence deficiencies and an uneven State presence in the concerned region. The central question is not why the United States conducted a strike in Sokoto, but why Nigeria still struggles to offer uniform protection to its citizens, regardless of their geographical location or the labels attached to their aggressors. Until this question is confronted with honesty, airstrikes—whether foreign or domestic—will continue to be symbols of reaction rather than practical solutions.

Rev. Ma, S. J., is a Jesuit priest and a public policy analyst. He currently writes from Abuja, Nigeria.