Ojukwu’s Mistake As The Leader Of Biafra -By Henry Chukwuemeka Onyema

On Tuesday, 30 May 1967, Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu formally declared the independence of the former Eastern region of Nigeria and its birth as the Republic of Biafra. That declaration, borne out of several unhappy developments that had rocked the Nigerian state since her independence, eventually culminated in a bloody civil war and it continues to reverberate in Nigeria fifty-three years after Biafra ceased to exist.

Fifty-six years after the birth of Biafra I want to briefly reflect on some of the mistakes Ojukwu made in his capacity as Biafra’s head of state. More than any other person, Ojukwu was pivotal to the birth, life and death of Biafra. It can be safely said that despite the herculean efforts of his latter day apostles like Nnamdi Kanu and Ralph Uwazurike, no other person embodied Biafra like Ojukwu. Maybe that was why he declared ‘…whilst I live Biafra lives. If I am no more it would only be a matter of time for the noble concept to be swept into oblivion.’ The determined efforts by latter-day Biafran agitators ironically give credence to this statement for though Ojukwu has been dead since 2011, he remains the defining deity in their struggle to actualize his dream.
The mistakes Ojukwu made as Biafra’s leader contributed to the failure of the Biafran project. Since history is a multi factor affair it can be argued that in spite of these mistakes Biafra probably did not have a chance of survival, given the circumstances in which she was born and the overwhelming forces arrayed against her. But we cannot ignore a country’s leadership in the pursuit of her manifest destiny.

First, Ojukwu’s disdain for the pre January 1966 civilian political class was a big issue. It can be conceded that they had not been the best while in power but how could he have hoped to successfully run a multi ethnic entity soaked in crises without the insights of these experienced men and women? Ojukwu had a mindset of political radicalism similar to that of the Nzeogwu/Ifeajuna group who saw the Nigerian political class as a colossal failure and staged the January 1966 coup against them. In his book ‘Because I am involved’ Ojukwu wrote ‘I was a radical as they (the Nzeogwu group) were, but then I was loaded with responsibilities as a battalion commander.’ Coincidentally Ojukwu was the commander of the Fifth Battalion of the Nigerian army during the coup. He was averse to a coup, at least by the time the Majors struck, and contributed significantly to their failure. Personal considerations also factored into Ojukwu’s disenchantment with the old political class. Although late Nnamdi Azikiwe was a close friend of Ojukwu’s father, Sir Louis Philippe Ojukwu, his son had a frosty relationship with him dating back to the 1964 general elections and Ojukwu’s recent period as the military governor of the Eastern Region. Matters were so strained that Azikiwe petitioned the head of state, General Ironsi, about his governor’s behaviour towards him. Ironsi was overthrown before he acted on the petition. One must take into account the fact that Ojukwu was young, insecure in his leadership position and unsure of loyalties. So it was rather tactical of him to keep the Old Guard at bay and form his inner circle. But it backfired in the long run and by the time he began to incorporate their input, especially in Biafra’s quest for diplomatic support, other factors had weighed down the fledgling state. Contrast this with Gowon who flooded his cabinet with many of the pre 1966 class, including the fathers of modern Nigerian nationalism such as Obafemi Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro.

I have not seen evidence to convince me that Ojukwu did a good job with the Midwestern invasion of September 1967. Why did he flood the commanding staff of the invasion force with officers from the January coup? Major Nzeogwu, now elevated to Colonel of the Biafran army, would have led the invasion, but his death at the Nsukka sector in July 1967 altered the equation. His successor was Victor Banjo, a close friend of Ojukwu and a firm supporter of the January 1966 coup, though he did not take part. He did not want a break up of Nigeria and he strenuously strived to get Ojukwu not to declare Biafra. Majors Ifeajuna, Ademoyega and Humphrey Chukwuka, who all played pivotal roles in the coup, were active participants in the invasion which they saw as a platform to continue their revolution and free Nigeria from Northern hegemony. To Ojukwu the invasion was an operation to break the backbone of the federal government in Lagos and build up a Southern front against Nigeria. Hence the declaration of the Midwest as the Republic of Benin was on the agenda. But the Midwest was even more multi ethnic than Biafra. What did Ojukwu and his forces do to win the hearts and minds of the Ishan, Afenmai, Edo, Urhobo and other groups unrelated to the Igbo? Did they want a Republic of Benin? The brevity of this essay does not allow for an analysis of the inadequacies of the logistics and military shortcomings of the invasion force.

A lot has been written by Ojukwu’s accusers about how he started and utilized the massive starvation in Biafra for political goals. To these people let the historical evidence speak. The policies that instituted starvation in Biafra emanated from Nigeria’s highest authorities at the time. This documented evidence will suffice.

‘Massive starvation is a legitimate aspect of war.’ Anthony Enahoro, the Commissioner of Information in Gowon’s cabinet.
‘Starvation is a legitimate weapon of war and we have every intention of using it against the rebels.’ Allison Ayida, Secretary to the Federal Government.

‘All is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don’t see why we should feed our enemies fat in order for them to fight harder.’ Obafemi Awolowo, the Commissioner of Finance in Gowon’s regime.

Ojukwu’s system of weapons acquisition for Biafra left a lot to be desired. He might have been concerned that putting this sensitive policy in the hands of professionals would empower them to undermine his government. Many of these military experts were his mates or even seniors before the declaration of Biafra. But then, giving the task to civilians who, though trusted, were unskilled in this area hurt the Biafran war effort. Could he have drawn a balance instead of relying solely on the likes of Christopher Mojekwu, a lawyer who was his townsman and the Biafran Commissioner for Home Affairs?
It is not to Ojukwu’s credit that he did very little to checkmate the saboteur paranoia among mostly Igbo Biafrans that began after the alleged Banjo coup and intensified as Biafra suffered military reversals. It tore the fabric of the army and strengthened the animosity between the Igbo and minority groups. Maybe the ‘sabo’ syndrome was a sop to the people in the face of their agonies. But there was absolutely no basis for maltreating the minority groups of Biafra. Yes, Igbo/minority politics had existed as far back as the 1950s but many Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, etc. gave their all for Biafra. An enlightened and sophisticated leader like Ojukwu should have strengthened the bonds the 1966 massacres created between the Igbo and minorities.

Ojukwu’s government was a dictatorship. The Biafran leader himself told his deputy, General Philip Effiong, that Biafra’s effective administration was made up of ‘Chukwuemeka’. ‘Odumegwu’ and ‘Ojukwu.’ This revelation came from his second army commander, Alexander Madiebo. People who disagreed with him were jailed, often without trial. If the removal of the first Biafran army commander, Brigadier Hilary Njoku, was because of reversals in the early stages of the war, was that sufficient reason for Ojukwu to lock him up for the duration of the war? Njoku’s vocal criticisms of Ojukwu’s policies were well documented and at a time he nearly resigned from the army. The popular argument against Banjo, Ifeajuna, Major Alale and Samuel Agbamuche, is that they plotted to unseat Ojukwu and they abandoned the Midwest to the enemy.

Perhaps what sealed their fate was a memo they submitted to the government calling for bold reforms within this period of dire uncertainty. The memo called for
1 Biafra printing her currency
2 Biafran army being fully reorganized and equipped
3 Decentralization of the government and inclusion of civilians in the cabinet
4 Mortgaging of Biafran oil to a foreign power in exchange for massive military assistance
5 If all the above failed there should be a ceasefire to prevent unnecessary loss of life

The tribunal that convicted Banjo and his colleagues found them guilty of INTENTION to carry out a coup. How does one measure an intention? The plotters had no right to appeal. It is my considered opinion that if the war had ended differently Ojukwu would have either resigned, or most likely, be unseated if he did not restore democratic rule.

In spite of all these points stated above, Ojukwu never abandoned, betrayed or sold his people when it mattered the most. Any honest reflection on Biafra must take that into consideration.

Henry Chukwuemeka Onyema is a historian, teacher and author. In 2020 he published a novella titled ‘In Love and In War.’