The Shot That Shook The Nation: An Overview Of The January 15 1966 Coup -By Henry Chukwuemeka Onyema

‘In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian armed forces, I declare martial law over the northern provinces of Nigeria.’  Those were the opening words of Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu’s speech that announced the January 15 1966 coup. Since that day, a lot has been said and written about Nigeria’s first military coup and admittedly, despite the plethora of information, including written works by some of the participants in the coup, the truth about the coup remains hard to accept, if not access. In retrospect that is understandable: the coup was totally unexpected, despite the situation in Nigeria at the time; its impacts were far-reaching, way beyond what its plotters anticipated, and fifty-five years after the event, it has been extremely difficult for Nigerians to find closure.

So who were the brains behind the coup? The word ‘brains’ is relative. There were those who conceived the plot; those who planned and organized the coup, including recruiting other plotters; then there were those who were not in the inner circle but were involved.

Leaked snippets of the Special Branch of the Nigerian police report on the coup say that Majors Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Donatus Okafor and Captain Ogbo Oji were the original members of the inner circle of the January plotters and that they began to plan the coup as far back as August 1965 to address the problems bedeviling Nigeria. However there is evidence that the plans for a coup among the officers who struck on Saturday January 15 1966 extended before 1965.

1 ‘Why We Struck’, an inside account of the coup by one of its most vibrant plotters in the person of Major Adewale Ademoyega,  shows  that as far as 1961, when Ademoyega enlisted into the army, he built a great friendship with Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna, who were already in the army. The three politically conscious young men believed in a military revolution to ‘shake up’ the new Nigerian state which many radicals and left-wing intellectuals still saw as a stooge of the British imperialists.  Over the years the trio‘s aspirations solidified into a plot and as the politicians’ misgovernance worsened, the officers got more recruits into their fold.

2 Other accounts report that the political crisis that engulfed Nigeria following the massively rigged 1964 general elections persuaded some of these 1966 plotters (and even some others who never participated in the coup) to contemplate military intervention. Major Ifeajuna and Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Banjo (who did not participate in the January coup but gave it his blessings) came up for mention in planning a military intervention to break the lock jam occasioned by the awful election. Major Nzeogwu, at the height of the 1966 coup, admitted that he had planned an operation during the 1964 army shooting competition to neutralize top military leaders who would be present by sedating them. It failed because the brass, probably suspicious in the tense situation or just being security-conscious, did not show up.

Be that as it may, the inner circle, troubled by the circumstances in the country, set about recruiting officers into their plan. Given the sensitive nature of a coup and the implications of discovery or failure for plotters, the January Boys, as they are colloquially known, were circumspect.  Though Nzeogwu was known to tell young officers at the Nigerian Military Training College, Kaduna, where he was the Chief Instructor: ‘wait until the day you will look at the senior officers through the sights of your rifle.’  Another officer was sufficiently concerned to report Nzeogwu to their superiors, namely Colonel Ralph Shodeinde and Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun.  Shodeinde who did not take action against his direct subordinate nevertheless noted that ‘there is never smoke without fire, even if it is smouldering fire.’ In response to Shodeinde’s assessment, the commander of the first brigade of the army based in Kaduna, Ademulegun, wrote that Nzeogwu was a young man in a hurry who should be closely watched.  Both men paid for their lackadaisical attitude with their lives in the early hours of January 15.

Contrary to the myth that five majors plotted the coup, the plotters surpassed the number. Below is a list of the main participants in the coup:

MAJORS

Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu

Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna

Adewale Ademoyega

Donatus Okafor

Humphrey Iwuchukwu  Chukwuka

Timothy Onwuatuegwu

Christian Anufuro

John  Obienu (who failed to show up on the day of the coup and joined the officers who crushed the coup after betraying his co-conspirators)

CAPTAINS

Ben Gbulie

Emma Nwobosi

Ogbonna Oji

Ganiyu Adeleke

Emmanuel Udeaja

LIEUTENANTS

Amechi Okaka

Edwin Okafor

Fola Oyewole

Olafimihan

2^ND LIEUTENANTS

Cyril Azubuogu

Harris Eghagha

Godfrey Ezedigbo

Ozoemena Igweze

Patrick Ibik

Bob Ikejiofor

John Atom Kpera

Emmanuel Nweke

Samson Emeka Omeruah

Dag  Waribor

The coup was organized on a national basis. Nzeogwu was the regional commander of the coup in Northern Nigeria, with Onwuatuegwu as a co-commander. There were officers under them such as Ben Gbulie. For Lagos, then the capital, the commander was Ifeajuna and co-commanders were Anuforo, Chukwuka, Ademoyega and Okafor. Ifeajuna also had oversight for the Western region but the actual operation was handled by Captain Nwobosi. Although the leaked Special Branch report –which this author has read – and certain writers who want to justify the argument that the coup was an Igbo plot say there was no coup attempt in the Eastern /Mid-Western regions which were led by Igbo politicians, but evidence to the contrary exists, including information from Ademoyega.

In his book, Ademoyega pointed out difficulties the plotters had in recruiting officers.  Major Chude-Sokei was one of their successes and he was in charge of the East. But before the coup he was sent outside Nigeria for a course. Ifeajuna and company had to go to work and in the same unit got one Lieutenant Oguchi to take his place. He was also on a course in Lagos and had a mechanical breakdown with his vehicle on his way, only getting there in the early hours of the 15^th.  Permit me to quote this information from page 54 of Max Silloun’s book ‘Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture’:

‘Contrary to popular myth, a coup was attempted in Enugu (East) and Benin (Mid-west). Overnight Major Ifeajuna sent orders to the first battalion in Enugu asking them to deploy soldiers to take over key installations and arrest government ministers in Enugu and Benin. As there was no military formation in the Mid west, no soldiers could be deployed directly from the region. For several hours the officers mulled over the strange but seemingly legitimate order (my explanation: operationally, the first battalion was under the command of the Lagos-based second brigade commanded by Brigadier Maimalari. Ifeajuna was the brigade major and could pass off instructions in that capacity, but they must be approved by Maimalari, a no-nonsense officer who trusted his brigade major. Alas, he was not aware of the illegality Ifeajuna was perpetrating in his official capacity). Finally they took position at the Enugu airport in the early hours of the morning. A different company of soldiers under Captain Joseph Ihedigbo also headed to the Mid west region’s capital of Benin. The Igbo premier of the region Dennis subsequently speculated that the life of the Eastern region’s premier, Dr. Michael Okpara, was spared because the head of state of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, was his guest at the time of the coup. A more plausible reason for Okpara’s survival is that the officer assigned to arrest him (Lieutenant Oguchi) was one of those who advocated a bloodless coup. As soon as Makarios departed to return to Cyprus, Okpara was arrested.’

In the North, the coup took place under the cover of a three-day night-time training exercise called Exercise Damisa (Hausa for Leopard). As chief instructor of the Nigerian Military Training College, Nzeogwu could organize such exercises without arousing any suspicion. On the final night of the exercise – midnight January 14 – he told the officers the real purpose for the exercise. The group, made up of military personnel from all parts of Nigeria, welcomed the idea of a coup to unseat the unpopular government.   Of the gathering Nzeogwu said in an interview with the defunct, Kaduna-based ‘New Nigerian’ newspaper of 18^th January 1966:

‘On Saturday morning the other officers and men thought they were going out only on a night exercise. It was not until they were out in the bush that they were told the full details of the plan….any man had the chance to drop out. More than that, they had bullets. They had been issued with bullets but I was unarmed. If they had disagreed they could have shot me… Most of the other ranks were northerners but they followed…. It was a truly Nigerian gathering. Only in the army do you get true Nigerianism.’

Nzeogwu and his officers and men either killed or were responsible for the deaths of the following political and military leaders in Kaduna, the capital of the Northern region and centre of many strategic military locations:

Ahmadu Bello-the Premier of the North

Hafsatu Bello-his wife

Brigadier Ademulegun-commander of the first brigade

Colonel Ralph Shodeinde-Nigerian Military Training College commandant

Latifat Ademulegun-the Brigadier’s wife

Zarunmi Sardauna-Ahmadu Bello’s bodyguard

Ahmed Ben Musa-the premier’s senior assistant secretary for security.

Ahmed Pategi-a government driver

Also, one of the soldiers who attacked Bello’s house with Nzeogwu was killed. There is an account that Nzeogwu shot him for refusing to fire the anti-tank weapon used on the premier’s house. Some of the policemen on guard duty at the premier’s house were reportedly shot by the intruders. Nzeogwu himself was wounded in the attack.

In Lagos, Ifeajuna hosted the plotters shortly after playing right-hand man to Brigadier Maimalari at a lavish party the latter had hosted to celebrate his new marriage. Ifeajuna also sent the signal to other operators outside Lagos to go ahead. He code-named the operation in Lagos ‘Operation New Wash.’. The party was a first-class reception attended by the bigwigs of the country in Lagos, including many of the plotters and other military officers who had attended a brigade military conference. The party was a befitting conclusion to the conference and Ifeajuna had big roles in organizing it as the brigade major.  At the meeting Adeleke initially had reservations and wanted to leave but was persuaded to stay.  I DOUBT IF HE WOULD HAVE SURVIVED THE NIGHT IF HE REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE. Ifeajuna and his colleagues used the cover of internal security operations to mobilize men, vehicles and weapons for their coup. This was possible because the military was involved in checking the instability in the Western region following the 1965 elections.

The rendezvous for the plotters, including the Western region operatives, was to be the Federal Guards Unit, commanded by Major Okafor. This unit provided security for the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa. Ademoyega was to make the broadcast at the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation announcing the military takeover.

Ifeajuna was responsible for the arrest of the prime minister. His death came later. Till date, there is still some controversy as to whether Ifeajuna shot him. The same Ifeajuna, assisted by Ezedigbo, shot Lieutenant-Colonel Abogo Largema. Ezedigbo and his team also arrested the Finance Minister, Chief Okotie-Eboh.

Anuforo, according to the Special Branch report, killed Colonel Kur Mohammed and Lieutenant-Colonels Pam and Unegbe, the only Igbo officer shot by the plotters. He, supported by Ademoyega, also murdered Okotie-Eboh. Pam was arrested by Major Chukwuka, his friend and second-in-command. He assured his family no harm would come to Pam but Anuforo, who outranked Chukwuka and apparently nursed bitterness towards Pam for the way he commanded the 1964 operations to rein in the restive Tiv in Northern Nigeria, brushed aside Chukwuka’s objections to sparing Pam and killed him.  Okafor bungled his tasks of arresting the GOC, Major-General Ironsi and Brigadier Maimalari. Ironsi was not home when the plotters came and his security detail stood firm denying Okafor access. Maimalari escaped only to run into Ifeajuna’s group. Unaware his brigade major was in the plot he flagged down Ifeajuna’s car and was promptly gunned down by his ‘rescuer.’ Ademoyega successfully carried out his task of seizing major installations in Lagos, including the Broadcasting Corporation and telephone exchange. All he had to do was make the broadcast when his colleagues had finished their tasks and they linked up with other operational zones nationwide.

Ironsi’s escape was the beginning of the coup’s failure. There are speculations that his escape was not totally due to his ability. Obasanjo wrote in his book ‘Nzeogwu’ that Ogbo Oji, one of the plotters, held back his finger on the trigger after meeting the escaping general on Carter bridge. Both men come from the Umuahia axis of Igboland and fraternal ties might have stayed Oji’s hand. But writing on the same escape, Fredrick Forsyth reported in his book ‘The Biafra Story’ that Ironsi practically browbeat Oji’s men at the roadblocks they set up by sheer military personality.  Colonel Pam or his wife apparently got a call across to the general before Pam was whisked off. And of course Ironsi’s guard commander would have filled him in when he returned, having gone to another party after Maimalari’s reception. One cannot rule out the strong possibility that Major Obienu tipped him off. Obienu did not come to the briefing at Ifeajuna’s house though he was at Maimalari’s party.  Being the commander of the second reconnaissance armoured squadron, his armoured vehicles were indispensable to the plotters. But he never showed up. What weakens the argument that Ironsi was somewhat ‘involved’ in the coup is Nzeogwu’s assertion after the coup that the general’s death was an indispensable part of the plot.

Subsequently Ironsi began countermeasures against the coup. A fact which worked in the  general’s favour is that as the army GOC (GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING), he could get all army officers to obey his orders and have unfettered access to all army installations and link up with the police, sister services and government agencies as well as seek foreign military help, though with government approval.

Meanwhile Nwobosi and his team took charge of the western region, arresting the deputy premier, Remi Fani-Kayode, and killing his boss, Premier Samuel Akintola, in a shoot-out. They set off for the Federal Guards Unit, Lagos, with the arrested Fani-Kayode and drove into the arms of Ironsi’s men who had now taken over the place.

Backed by many military and police officers, Ironsi put down the coup in Lagos. All the plotters, except Anuforo and Ademoyega, sought safety in flight.  Ifeajuna and Okafor’s apparent joint escape gave a strong element of treachery and double-dealing within the ranks of the plotters. Anuforo and Ademoyega, having failed to hold on to Lagos, headed to Abeokuta to see if they could get Obienu to join them with his much-needed ferrets.  Although Obienu was not present Anuforo used his position as the squadron’s former commander to mobilize ferrets. On their way back to Lagos they stopped to refuel and heard a radio broadcast about the failed mutiny by a dissident section of the Nigerian armed forces. The officers commanding the ferrets abandoned the plotters and one even pulled a gun on Anuforo when he came after them.  Anuforo and Ademoyega now set off for Kaduna by train. In retrospect they should have made haste by car.

Nzeogwu succeeded fully in the North but he got no situation report from Lagos. To worsen matters no broadcast came, except the announcement about dissident soldiers carrying out a mutiny. So Nzeogwu went on air with his famous broadcast.  Two power centres now existed in Nigeria; the north under Nzeogwu; the entire south, including Lagos /east/mid-west, under Ironsi. A war seemt imminent as Nzeogwu was bent on finishing the coup. What was left of the civilian government handed over to Ironsi. Whether willingly or unwillingly remains a matter for debate till date. It took a written agreement between Nzeogwu and Ironsi, whose position was by no means secure, and the personal intervention of his emissary, Lt.-Col. Conrad Nwawo, before NZEOGWU AGREED TO GO TO Lagos. Nwawo was Nzeogwu’s former teacher and the coup plotter had a lot of respect for him. The written agreement stipulated that Nzeogwu and his colleagues would not be tried for their coup; that those of them already detained should be freed; that the people they overthrew will not be returned to power; and the families of military personnel killed in the coup be compensated.  Nzeogwu handed over the governorship of the North to Major Hassan Usman Katsina, son of the Emir of Katsina, and flew to Lagos where Ironsi’s men summarily arrested him at the airport and bundled him into detention. The manhunt for free plotters was a success. Virtually all the principal plotters were arrested, including Ifeajuna who had fled across the border under disguise and ended up in Ghana where he was welcomed by President Kwame Nkrumah, a bitter ideological rival of Balewa.  Ghana also housed other fugitives fleeing from Nigerian justice for their roles in the alleged 1962 plan to unseat the government, namely S.G. Ikoku. The military who overthrew Nkrumah gladly extradited Ifeajuna to Nigeria.

WHY DID THE PLOTERS OF JANUARY 15 1966 STRIKE?

To understand the motives for the coup, perhaps the best thing is to read Nzeogwu’s coup speech.  However, it must be borne in mind that understanding the reasons why a group of people take up arms against their country’s government is always a complex thing.  The reasons for the coup may be summarized thus:

1 The plotters were determined to end the instability and bloodshed generated by the crises that followed the massively rigged 1965 regional elections in the Western region and the general elections of 1964.

2 The plotters saw the current government as incompetent, clueless and increasingly authoritarian. In this regard, they were not alone. Since 1962 crisis after crisis had rocked the country and the government had badly mismanaged them, namely, the western region parliament crisis of 1962; the census controversy of 1963; the general strike of 1964; and the Tiv uprising of 1964.

3 THE COUP PLOTTERS WERE ANGRY OVER THE USE OF THE ARMY TO FORCEFULLY QUELL INTERNAL CRISES.EG. THE TIV UPRISINGS. Many of the plotters served in these operations and blamed the politicians for the crises and wrong use of the army.

4 Massive corruption and venality among the ruling-class also infuriated the plotters.

5 The plotters (and quite a few other military officers) were angry over the politicization of the military and diluting of standards by the ruling-class in a bid to reduce the stronghold of the South on the army. The colonial era had seen the Southerners, especially the Igbo, flooding the army, especially the officer corps, because the British laid emphasis on qualifications. Sadly, much of the North was educationally disadvantaged and thus most of the Northerners who joined the army ended up in the fighting infantry while the South flooded the technical services and made it to officer grade. The North-dominated government sought to change things after independence and this created disequilibrium.

6 Many of the plotters were well educated men who wanted to implant left-wing ideology in Nigeria, then the vogue in many parts of Africa and Latin America.

7 Interestingly, the plotters claimed they had no desire to take over the government. Nzeogwu, the coup’s spokesman, declared that: ‘neither myself nor any of the other lads was in the least interested in governing the country. We were soldiers and not politicians. We had earmarked from the list known to every soldier in this operation who would be what. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was, for example, to be released from jail immediately and to be made the executive provisional president of Nigeria. We were going to make civilians of proven honesty and efficiency who would be thoroughly handpicked to do all the governing.’

One can read books by Ademoyega, and Captains Ben Gbulie and Emma Nwobosi, to see how much the plotters respected Awolowo and plans they had for him in their coup.  Ironically, many of the plotters were Igbo and Awo was Yoruba. Awo, one of the leading lights of Nigeria’s indepence movement, was in jail at the time of the coup for allegedly leading a 1962 plot to unseat the Balewa government by force of arms. He was the official opposition leader and in that capacity, severely took the government to task with scathing and erudite criticisms. His socialist left-wing rhetoric agreed with the plotters’ mindset; they bought into many of his solutions to Nigeria’s problems.  Major Nzegwu of the Air Force and Captain Udeaja’s mandate in the coup was to fly to Calabar on the eve of the coup and free Awolowo from prison. They could not achieve this before Ironsi counter-struck.

Nobody should conclude that the coup had Awo’s blessing or support. Evidence shows that the plotters acted independently. Ifeajuna wrote that if Awo refused to cooperate with the plotters he would be locked up in the State House and decrees issued in his name. Many other young military officers and civilians admired Awolowo back then as the face of the radical movement in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Superficially the coup looks like an Igbo plot: almost all its leading plotters Igbo or Igbo-speaking; almost all its victims’ non-Igbo. And Ironsi who crushed it and became head of state was Igbo.

But let the facts speak for themselves

1 Non-Igbo officers took part.

2 The stated aim of bringing Awo, who was no political friend of the Igbo, to power, does not sit with the Igbo angle.

3 Northerners were actively involved in executing the coup and even had sympathy for the coup, particularly from the minority groups of the North.  Late Colonel Yohana Madaki said in 1986 in an interview with the African Concord magazine that he would have gladly participated in the coup if Nzeogwu had approached him.

4 Contrary to the argument that Unegbe was shot for refusing to surrender keys to the armoury (which were not with him since he was the army’s quarter-master general), Ademoyega wrote in pages 60-61 of his book that Unegbe was earmarked for arrest from day one by the plotters. So his death was not a mistake, in a manner of speaking.

I wish the coup never took place. Being idealistic young men, the plotters had no real understanding of the nature of Nigerian society or the power of the ethnic loyalties which the enemies of the country would unleash with their coup. The killings were downright brutal, no matter the justifications.eg. the LITTLE CHILDREN OFTHE ADEMULEGUNS SAW THEIR PARENTS GUNNED DOWN BY OFFICERS WHO WERE CLOSE FAMILY FRIENDS.  The coup bred instinctive ethnic hatred and distrust. True, the government of the day messed up the country and perhaps the plotters felt they had to use the gun to settle demanding questions, but they unleashed even greater problems than the ones they set out to solve, namely the counter coup of July 29 1966 and the civil war.

Henry Chukwuemeka Onyema is a historian, teacher and author of the novella IN LOVE AND IN WAR. Email: henrykd2009@yahoo.com.