The Northern Security Fund: Questions We Must Ask Before We Pay -By Leonard Karshima Shilgba

Lately, Nigerians have heard of a proposed Northern Security Fund—a levy of ₦1 billion monthly from each of the 19 northern states, including Benue State, “to be deducted at source.” As usual, the political elite have moved ahead of the people with a plan shrouded in silence, ambiguity, and questionable legality. Before any state government—especially a cash-strapped Benue—commits a kobo to such a fund, we must interrogate the logic, the legality, the morality, and the application framework of the proposal.

Because, truth be told, Nigeria’s security crisis is not first a money problem.

1. Is Nigeria’s Security Challenge a Money Problem?

Nigeria spends hundreds of billions of naira annually on security. The defence budget is one of the largest components of national expenditure, yet the results remain painfully underwhelming. Communities across Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Zamfara, Taraba, and Niger continue to suffer attacks, sacking, and occupation.

Our problem is not scarcity of funds but scarcity of accountability.

Let me illustrate this lack of accountability and transparency with an existing opaque security expenditure voting system in Nigeria called “security votes”:

“Security Vote” is one of the most misunderstood—and controversial—components of public expenditure in Nigeria. Every Nigerian state makes provision for it, yet no law clearly defines its structure, spending procedure, accountability requirements, or reporting standards. The result is a system shrouded in opacity.

Here is how it works in practice across almost all 36 states:

a. Governor Proposes the Budget

Each year, the Governor submits the Appropriation Bill to the State House of Assembly.
Within that bill, there is usually a line item called “Security Vote”, “Security Services”, “Special Security Expenditure”, “Government Security Operations”, or some similarly vague label.

The exact amount differs widely by state—some states allocate ₦200 million monthly, others ₦700 million to over ₦1 billion monthly.

b. The State House of Assembly Votes on It

The budget—including the security vote line item—is subject to legislative approval:

• The Appropriation Committee reviews it.
• The full House debates and passes it.
• The governor signs it into law.

Therefore, security votes are “voted” through the normal statutory budget process, but the details are usually hidden under broad headings. But, “legally”, the State House of Assembly  appropriates the “security votes” for the state.

Practical Control

In reality, the Governor exclusively controls the security vote.
The funds:

• Are drawn directly from the state treasury
• Are treated as “extra-budgetary” or “discretionary spending” once allocated
• Do not require open bidding, procurement processes, or public justification

Thus, while the legislature appropriates, the governor solely administers.

 How Security Vote Funds Are Spent

Security vote spending is deliberately opaque. But the typical usage includes:

a. Support for Security Agencies

Governors often fund:

• Fuel for patrol vehicles
• Allowances for police, DSS, Civil Defence, or military units
• Purchase or repair of equipment
• Logistics during crises

These expenditures are real, though they lack transparency.

b. Payments to Traditional Rulers, Local Vigilantes, or Community Networks

Some governors use security votes to mobilize:

• Local hunters
• Livestock guards
• Anti-open-grazing enforcement teams
• Traditional councils
• Youth groups assisting in community policing

c. Intelligence Gathering

Funds may be used for:

• Informants
• Covert operations
• Community-level intelligence networks

This is one of the stated reasons security votes are kept off public records.

d. Political Stabilization

A significant percentage (informally acknowledged) goes toward:

• Maintaining political allies
• Funding political structures
• Managing unrest or protests
• Strategic patronage

This is not officially admitted, but widely reported.

e. Expenditures the Governor Wishes to Keep Unpublished

Since the funds are discretionary, many governors treat them as:

• A personal pool for emergency expenditures
• Travel logistics
• Unprogrammed expenses
• Political negotiations

This makes accountability almost impossible.

 Why Are Security Votes Not Audited?

a. Classified as “Security-Sensitive”

Governors argue that disclosing details would:

• Expose intelligence sources
• Compromise operations
• Endanger security personnel

b. Lack of Legal Framework

No federal or state law provides a clear standard for:

• Record-keeping
• Reporting
• Public disclosure
• Audit requirements

As a result, security votes operate outside formal auditing systems.
Even state auditors-general have limited access to detailed records.

What Are the Main Problems With the Security Vote System?

• Zero transparency
• No performance measurement
• High potential for diversion and misuse
• Lack of legislative oversight
• Inconsistent spending between states
• Personalization of public funds

Civil society organizations estimate that over ₦240 billion is spent annually nationwide on security votes alone.

 How Should Security Votes Work (In an Ideal System)?

A reformed system would include:

• Legal definition of security votes
• Standardized guidelines for expenditure
• Mandatory reporting to the legislature (even if confidential)
• Independent audit of non-sensitive components
• Clear alignment with policing and community security strategies

Until such reforms occur, security votes will remain vulnerable to abuse.

From the above explanation of the opacity and apparent abuse of “security votes” in Nigeria, with no apparent commensurate societal security outcomes that should justify those “votes”, it is understandable if Nigerians are livid about the proposed “Northern Security Fund” and some view it as a “political stabilization fund” instead.

• Where is the audit of previous security allocations?
• Who evaluates the effectiveness of previous interventions?
• What structural reforms have been made in policing, intelligence, and border control?

Throwing more money into a leaking bucket is not strategy; it is waste.

2. How Viable Is This Northern Security Fund?

To assess viability, we must ask:

Who establishes the fund? Under what law?
The Northern Governors’ Forum is not a constitutional body empowered to levy compulsory payments on states, even drawing “from source” (i. e , from the Federation Account, for instance, as Irrevocable Payment Orders!). Only the State Houses of Assembly and National Assembly can authorize public expenditure of this scale.

What is the governance structure?
If ₦19 billion per month (₦228 billion per year) will flow into a regional purse, Nigerians must know:

• Who will manage it?
• What transparency mechanisms exist?
• Will it be subject to legislative oversight?
• What are the measurable outcomes?

Anything short of this is an invitation to more opacity and misuse of public funds.

3. Can Benue State Realistically Benefit?

Benue is among the states that have suffered the most devastating consequences of insecurity, particularly herdsmen attacks, rural displacement, and agricultural disruption. But contributing ₦1 billion monthly to a fund whose operational clarity is absent may amount to subsidizing other states’ security without receiving proportional benefit.

For Benue to benefit:

• there must be clear allocation criteria,
• defined response mechanisms,
• and a binding framework guaranteeing that contributions translate into tangible protection for its people.

Without these, Benue risks becoming a donor, not a beneficiary.

4. Does “the North” Have a Security Force?

No.
Security in Nigeria remains the constitutional responsibility of:

• The Armed Forces,
• The Nigeria Police Force,
• Civil Defence,
• and licensed community or local vigilante units (under state laws).

The “North” as a geopolitical concept has no legal security architecture. It cannot raise an army, create a police force, or deploy coercive weapons. At best, it can coordinate region-wide community policing initiatives—but only within the law and through the individual states.

Therefore, any fund implying the creation of a regional force must be viewed with caution. I must, however, commend the Northern Governors’ Forum for calling for the creation of State Police and urging northern lawmakers at both federal and state levels to support the constitutional  creation of a state policing system in Nigeria. The Forum should sustain pressure on the northern lawmakers until this system is established.

5. How Should a Regional Security Fund Be Applied—If At All?

If northern governors genuinely want to collaborate on security, funds must be channelled into:

a. Joint Intelligence Infrastructure

• Cross-border intelligence sharing
• Drone surveillance
• Data centers for real-time tracking of movement across state borders

b. Strengthening State-Based Community Policing

Each state should maintain control over its own legal vigilance structures, equipped and trained to respond within the law. This is where the Forum’s call for state policing makes sense.

c. Border and Forest Monitoring

Terrorist camps operate in forest belts cutting across states. Joint forest patrol and air reconnaissance could be funded regionally, but transparently and accountably.

d. Victim Support and Rehabilitation

States like Benue, Plateau, and Southern Kaduna need financial support to resettle displaced persons and restore livelihoods.

These are areas where regional cooperation is logical—but only under strict oversight.

6. Where Is the Justification and Transparency?

At the heart of this issue is a failure of communication. No northern government has addressed:

• The legal foundation of the fund
• The operational plan
• The accountability mechanism
• The duration of contributions
• The expected outcomes

A policy that aims to collect nearly a quarter trillion naira yearly must not be anchored on behind-the-curtain consultations. It must survive public scrutiny.

Conclusion: Benue Must Ask Questions Before Paying

No one denies that insecurity has bled northern Nigeria for too long. But solutions built on opacity and haste will not deliver peace. Benue should not be stampeded into a financial commitment that lacks:

• Constitutional clarity,
• Administrative transparency,
• State-by-state benefit assurance,
• A measurable security improvement plan.

Security collaboration is welcome. A blank cheque is not.

This is the time for leaders to speak boldly. Silence is costly. And in matters of security, ambiguity is dangerous.