Bomb Blasts: The Failure Of The Nigerian Intelligence Services.

The various Nigerian intelligence services (DMI, DSS, NSA, CID et al) have failed to be proactive in their activities, hence the lack of ability to predict Boko Haram’s attacks before they occur.  Someone or a designated cell is making these explosive devices and supplying them to these militants. These devices are being made at a certain location and transported by some means. There must be a cache of the components for these devices stored in a certain location.  Someone is training these militants on how to conduct these attacks. It is the job of our intelligence organizations to discover these now nearly-ubiquitous people and their deadly devices.

Apart from clandestine means that could detect some of these crude, low-grade but deadly components, there are various overt processes that can be used to determine the signatures of these ignoble people. Had we built a real intelligence institution, we would have been able to detect latent, heat, fingerprint and biochemical signatures undoubtedly left at every attack scene by these perpetrators of evil.

With a modern forensic laboratory and trained investigators, we would have been able to come to an intelligent understanding of what is happening on the terror front. And we would have been able to prevent or, at least, predict future ones and probably interdict potential perpetrators.

After attacks like the Boko Haram’s occur, the scene is littered with copious amount of tangible Intelligence material that can be associated with the residual devices. Also, all Persons of Interest (POI) that are detained on scene can also provide valuable Intelligence. Although, such technical and rigorous intelligence procedures may not completely stop the activities of a determined and motivated Boko Haram in the country, it will affect and greatly degrade their ability to operate as freely as they now do. It will make them vulnerable.  But for us to maximize forensic analysis, our Intelligence services should also bring awareness to the public on how to not contaminate the explosion sites.  From watching amateur videos of the aftermath of some of the attacks, even security personnel and fire fighters could be seen improperly handling potential evidence. We must learn to protect the integrity of these attack sites until we professionally process them.

In the last several months, Boko Haram has established and publicly demonstrated clearly discernible Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) during their operations. A suicide vest wearer detonates an explosive device, causing survivors to flee in a stampede. The primary explosive attack is followed by a secondary small arms fires attack from militants who ambush those trying to escape.

In the recent amateur video recording of the attacks in both Damaturu and Kano, it was obvious that majority of the general public lacks the understanding on how to react during these attacks.  Most of the lives lost could have been saved if the security services had done the needful to avoid the secondary attacks of small arm fires. These are modes of attacks straight out of infantry battle training manuals; something with which our military leaders are quite familiar. And if they know these things, the least they could do is educate the innocent and vulnerable civilians about what to do to avoid being victims of, at least, these secondary attacks.  They could also do more in educating locals to keep their eyes open for things and people that appear strange to them.

To effectively combat terrorism and end this menace, the government must hold a multi-party national summit comprising of both civilian and military personnel that have the erudition and solid grounding in security and intelligence processes.